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analyses of these issues. We take the merger paradox from the standard oligopoly literature as a 
starting point and show that in the absence of any cost-synergies of merger activities, firms do have 
an incentive to divest further instead of joining mergers. We then analyze conditions where mergers 
may emerge endogenously as a result of a market game. Due to the nature of the interaction of 
market-share and market-concentration effects in Cournot oligopolies, a stable internal equilibrium 
where mergers arise endogenously and simultaneously requires both cost synergies and cost dis-
synergies. Endogenous merger size is then a function of market parameters as well as cost synergy 
parameters. Hence anticipated changes in market size or cost synergies attainable through mergers 
lead to reconfigurations of merger sizes. If ex-ante expectations about merger-promoting changes are 
not fully realized ex-post, merger waves will be followed by divestiture waves. Firm valuation - 
based on ex-ante expectation - may increase while actual profits and efficiency of the merged entity - 
according to the ex-post realization - may fall. 
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1. Introduction 
The waves of corporate mergers during the nineties and at the beginning of the new millennium have 
sparked new interest in economic analyses of the preconditions and consequences of increasing 
market concentration. In the EU alone, cross-border mergers reached almost USD 600 Billion in the 
year 2000 after rising steadily since 1988.1 Since then, European merger activity has slowed down 
again considerably. The merger boom of the early 2000s is only the last of maybe five major merger 
waves documented.2 In contrast to mergers earlier in the last century, recent mergers are mostly 
horizontal3 and increasingly cross-border.4 There is also mounting evidence that high merger activity 
is followed by subsequent divestitures by some of these mergers. For example, one of the biggest 
mergers of this recent wave was the purchase of Time Warner by AOL5; in 2005 news reports 
appeared about plans to divest Time Warner Inc. in order to increase its market valuation.6 In 
general, the number of divestitures may be said to have increased in tandem with the number of 
mergers since the mid-1980s and during the 1990s.7 In addition, for the 1990s, there is evidence that 
maybe half of all merger activities in the U.S. were divestitures.8 When mergers occur, they mostly 
decrease profits and efficiency while increasing market value. The results are similar across different 
countries and sectors, and also between domestic and cross-border mergers.9 Nevertheless, 
                                                                 
1 UNCTAD (2000) and UNCTAD (World Investment Report, reported in CESifo Forum, 5(4), Winter 2004). For a 
general overview of recent developments, see, e.g. Markusen (2002). 
2 See, e.g., Golbe/White (1993) for a documentation of the last four waves. 
3 Using Thompson Financial Security data from the mid-1980s to late 1990s, Pryor (2001) reports that roughly two-
thirds to three-quarters of all mergers in value terms were within the same SIC industry. Measured in numbers, 
these shares are around half. Furthermore, about 60 percent of mergers at the end of the 1990s were in 
manufacturing, communication, and financial services. Similar results are reported by Gugler, et al. (2003). 
4According to Gugler, et al. (2003), the share of cross-border mergers among European mergers in the 1990 rose 
from about 24 to close to 40 percent. 
5 This acquisition had a planned value of USD 165 billion. In the same year, there was Mannesmann and 
Vodafone Airtouch at USD 183 billion, SmithKline Beecham and Glaxo Wellcome at USD 76 billion, Pfizer and 
Warner Lambert at USD 92 billion, and Warner Records with EMI’s music division at USD 20 billion. (Quoted from 
Pryor, 2001.) 
6 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 August 2005, p. 21.  The same issue also contained reports about the German 
Telekom’s failed plans to take over O2, Springer’s takeover of the German television station Pro Sieben Sat 1, and 
Herlitz’s takeover by Stationary Products, a Luxembourg-based company owned in turn by the US investment 
fund Advent International... 
7 Compare the data reported in Gugler et al. (2001), Table 1, based on SDC Thompson Financial Securities data. 
8 See, e.g., Mulherin/Boone (2000). 
9 See Berry/Pakes (1993) and Gugler et al. (2003) for summaries. The latter, in particular, use a large panel data set 
in order to analyze the effects of mergers internationally and over time. For this purpose, merging firms’ profits 
and sales before and after the merger are compared. Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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industrial concentration has apparently increased during the last two decades.10 Increased 
concentration may also have lead to increased product variety as well as to increased entry and exit 
activities.11 
We aim to incorporate these stylized facts about mergers into the behavior of a standard oligopoly 
model. In the  traditional industrial-organization literature, oligopoly models are used to analyze 
mergers, their effects on market concentration, and firms’ incentives to participate in them.12 Our 
study methodologically extends these earlier approaches while also referring to some newer literature 
on mergers with product differentiation and trade13. However, earlier literature already emphasized 
that this approach may lead to paradoxical results. The original merger paradox in a homogeneous 
Cournot oligopoly without cost effects14 emphasizes several points: 1.) For a single firm, the marginal 
incentive to form a merger with another firm – i.e. a pair-wise merger – is negative. The marginal 
incentive to join a merger of size m < n where n is the number of firms in the market is also negative 
for small n and only becomes positive when at least about half the market participates. This is due to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Event studies looking at changes in market valuation typically find that acquiring firms break even while acquired 
firms gain. See, e.g. Banerjee/Eckard (1998). 
Models analyzing competition and market concentration in differentiated-product markets with exogenous market 
size have been forwarded by e.g. Trajtenberg (1985), Bresnahan (1987), Anderson et al. (1992). Analyses of 
mergers’ effects on prices and profits are contained in e.g. Nevo (2000) and Ivaldi/Verboven (2001), whereas Berry 
et al. (1995), Petrin (2000), and Nevo (2000) present the effects on substitution behavior of consumers. 
Studies investigating particular industries have been forwarded recently, e.g. by Gugler/Siebert (2004) for the 
semiconductor industry, by Berry/Waldfogel (2001) for radio broadcast markets, and by Park, et al. (2001) for 
railroad mergers. Earlier studies on railroad mergers were conducted by MacDonald (1987 and 1989), 
Lemke/Babcock (1987). 
10 Effects of mergers on market shares have been investigated by Mueller (1985). Using panel data for the largest 
1000 firms between 1950 and 1972, and controlling for non-relevant factors, the market shares of acquired firms are 
compared to those of non-acquired firms. The results indicate that acquired firms perform rather worse than non-
acquired firms, which is interpreted as evidence against the hypothesis that mergers improve efficiency. Pryor 
(2001) analyzes data from Thompson Financial Securities for 1985-1999 and finds that enterprise size and industrial 
concentration have both increased. Similar conclusions were drawn by Golbe/White (1993). 
11 Effects on product variety were investigated by Berry/Waldfogel (2001) using a panel data set of 243 U.S. radio 
broadcast markets in 1993 and 1997. Since the Telecommunications Act of 1996 substantially relaxed ownership 
restrictions in these markets, increased concentration has reduced station entry while increasing variety. 
The long-term effects of mergers are taken into account by studies using dynamic merger models (see e.g. 
Berry/Pakes, 1993; Pakes/McGuire, 1994). One major aspect of long-term behavior to be taken into account here is 
entry and exit of firms adjusting to the new market structure resulting from mergers. Furthermore, the relevance of 
innovative activities and product innovations for merger behavior had already been noticed early on (Stigler, 
1965). 
12 See, e.g., Jacquemin/Slade (1988), Salant/Switzer/Reynolds (1983), Perry/Porter (1985), Farell/Shapiro (1990), 
Berry/Pakes (1993). 
13 See, e.g. Long/Vousden (1995), Falvey (1998, 2003), Horn/Levinsohn (2001), Ryan/Kendall (2001), Neary (2003), 
Tombak (2003). 
14 Salant/Switzer/Reynolds (1983). Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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two counter-acting effects, the negative market-share effect15 and the positive market-concentration 
effect. For small merger sizes, the market-share effect dominates, while for mergers approaching all 
firms, the market-concentration effect dominates. 2.) A single firm will only improve its profits - 
compared to non-merger oligopoly profits – when it participates in a merger covering at least 80 
percent of the market. 3.) For a firm staying single while another merger forms in the market, both 
the market-share effect and the market-concentration effect are positive. An outside firm always 
gains more than any merger participant. 
We take the merger paradox as a starting point and show that in the absence of any cost-synergies 
or similar effects of merger activities, firms do even have a strong incentive to divest further instead of 
joining mergers. We then analyze conditions where mergers may emerge endogenously as a result of 
a market game.16 Due to the nature of the interaction of market-share and market-concentration 
effects in Cournot oligopolies, a stable internal equilibrium where mergers arise endogenously and 
simultaneously requires both cost synergies and cost dis-synergies. We derive the conditions for the 
existence of such an equilibrium and describe its properties. In the resulting equilibrium, endogenous 
merger size is a function of market parameters as well as cost synergy parameters. Hence anticipated 
changes in market size and/or cost synergies attainable through mergers will lead to reconfigurations 
of merger sizes.  
If ex-ante expectations about merger-promoting changes are not fully realized ex-post, merger waves 
will be followed by divestiture waves in our model. In addition, firm valuation - based on ex-ante 
expectation - may increase while actual profits and efficiency of the merged entity - according to the 
ex-post realization - may fall. Our model is also adaptable to an international trade context.17 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys previous theoretical work on 
mergers and acquisitions. Our model of mergers with differentiated products and Cournot 
competition is presented in section 3. Section 4 analyzes incentives to merge or to divest when costs 
are not changed by mergers.  In section 5, the optimal merger size in a model of monopolistic 
                                                                 
15 Since the market-share effect also leads to the reduction of market shares of other firms in the own merger, it is 
also called cannibalization effect. See, e.g., Huck/Konrad (2004) or in the context of multi-product firms 
Eckel/Neary (2005). 
16 Lindqvist/Stennek (2005) provide experimental evidence on the persistence of the insider’s dilemma in merger 
formation and conclude that this provides support for endogenous merger theory. 
17 Compare our model with the setup in Huck/Konrad (2004). In addition, if cost effects arise only for the case of 
cross-border mergers, our model can give rise to joint cross-border mergers and domestic divestitures. Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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competition with variable-cost synergies is derived.  The last section summarizes the findings and 
concludes. 
 
2. Previous Models of Mergers and Acquisitions 
This section discusses some of the theoretical literature on mergers18 used as a basis for our own 
modeling.  Traditional methods analyze horizontal mergers assuming that products in the relevant 
market are homogenous (Jacquemin/Slade, 1988). Thus, Salant/Switzer/Reynolds (1983), modeling 
mergers as an exogenous change in market structure starting from an initial Cournot equilibrium and 
doing comparative statics, show that most exogenous mergers are unprofitable for the merging firms, 
while outsiders not participating in the merger gain. This is the “Merger Paradox“. In the standard 
Cournot setting without cost-altering effects of mergers, profitable mergers would have to involve 
more than 80 percent of the market while outsiders would always gain more than insiders. Other 
authors such as Farell/Shapiro (1990) find that mergers in a Cournot oligopoly not creating cost 
synergies will raise prices and decrease market share. On the other hand, in the presence of cost 
synergies, output-reducing mergers can improve welfare by closing down inefficient firms. Allowing 
for pair-wise mergers significantly reduces the minimum share of the market necessary to participate 
in mergers in order to make them profitable. However, the outsider advantage from mergers remains. 
See Böckem (2002), Neus (2002). 
Other authors, such as Kamien/Zang (1993) or Rothschild (1999), Tombak (2002),  Böckem 
(2002), Ulukut (2003) study horizontal mergers between firms with heterogeneous costs. Different 
but fixed unit production costs lead here to two effects, one encouraging mergers while the other 
discourages them. Mergers between high and low-cost firms decrease average cost of the merging 
firms; this is a positive effect similar to cost synergies. Mergers with high-cost rivals tend to decrease 
market price, since the high-cost, high-price rival is removed from the market; this tends to make 
mergers of that kind less profitable. As a result, there is only a particular window of cost asymmetries 
where mergers of this kind are profitable. With both very high and very low cost asymmetries, 
mergers will not take place. In this context, note that a large part of the mergers and trade literature 
also operates with explicitly different costs or cost asymmetries due to trade costs. Perry/Porter 
(1985) introduce strong cost economies due to a tangible asset available in fixed quantity that 
                                                                 
18 A well structured review of the theoretical literature is also provided by Ulukut (2003). Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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reduces marginal costs. Each firm has a fixed fraction of this asset. Depending on the degree of cost 
synergies, this significantly increases merger incentives. Due to cost reductions resulting from a 
merger, insiders now have an advantage over outsiders and may gain more than the latter. The 
sources of such cost-synergies are explicitly taken into account in some newer literature; e.g., 
Davidson/Ferrett (2005) introduce spillovers from R&D between merging firms only. 
In order to analyze price competition19 fully, some degree of product differentiation needs to be 
introduced. For this case, Deneckere/Davidson (1985) show that mergers are always profitable for 
insiders, even without resulting synergies, since prices act as strategic complements. However, 
outsiders still gain more by such mergers. Consequently, other literature such as 
McAfee/Simons/Williams (1992) or Lommerud/Sørgard (1997), Rothschild (2000), Rothschild et. 
al. (2000) explores different conditions such as locational differences and multi-product operations. 
Werden/Froeb (1994) show how such a model can be estimated and simulated combining logit 
demands with constant marginal costs. For the purpose of estimating mergers empirically for the 
semiconductor industry, Gugler/Siebert (2004) introduce a model with heterogeneous products and 
quantity competition.20 We will use a similar framework for our analysis below. 
 
3. A Basic Model of Mergers with Differentiated Products and Cournot Competition 
For a model with differentiated products and Cournot oligopoly, we present an analysis of 
endogenous merger formation. After introducing the model, we solve the second Cournot-stage of 
the game. Since we assume symmetric utility and ex-ante identical firms, we can make use of the 
resulting aggregative properties of the game in the second stage. This is followed by deriving the first 
stage of the game: a non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium in forming cooperative mergers. While this 
will result in multiple symmetric Nash-equilibria, there will be a unique equilibrium that is not Pareto-
dominated by any alternative. This constitutes a form of coalition formation where participating firms 
                                                                 
19 Zachau (1987) introduces mergers into the standard model of price competition with vertically differentiated 
products (Gabszewicz/Thisse, 1979, 1980; Shaked/Sutton, 1982, 1983). He finds that both the merging and the 
outside firms always gain by a merger. Furthermore, mergers are sometimes more profitable for the merging firms 
than for the outside firms. However, when merger decisions are fully endogenous, the monopoly created by a 
merger of all firms is the unique stable industry structure in a very strong sense. For newer related literature on 
vertical product differentiation, see also Wauthy (1996), Greenstein/Ramey (1998), Johnson/Myatt (2003). 
20  Apparently, there is no other l iterature using this approach, even though many industries besides the 
semiconductor industry could be characterized by this kind of competition. Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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only care about the resulting size of the coalition, but not about individual firm identities. We also 
make use of the property that any merger configuration forms a partition of the initial market. 
 
3.1. Model Setup 
There are n identical firms or plants (and their respective products) in a single (domestic) market. 
Firms may collude with other firms to form a merger. Otherwise each single-product firm is identical. 
Costs may depend on the number of single-product plants (or firms) m being part of an existing 
merger. Marginal production cost is denoted asnm. Setup (“fixed”) cost per single-product plant are 
fm . Without cost economies of scope we will drop the suffix m from these variables. Marginal costs 
may exhibit economies of scope; in this case nm’ < 0, nm” ‡ 0. Setup cost per single-product plant 
may exhibit diseconomies of scope withfm’ > 0, fm” ‡ 0 . 
Utility is quadratic with potentially imperfect substitutability21, resulting in linear demands. Denote the 
aggregate quantity demanded of good i as qi. Let a > 0, b > 0, 0 = ?  = b. With L consumers 














  (3.1) 
Note that utility and demand are completely symmetric with respect to products. 
Firms play a two-stage industry game: 
1) Firms simultaneously choose their optimal merger size and join a merger of that size; 
2) Firms simultaneously compete in quantities (Cournot). 
Our model is quite flexible and can capture a number of different constellations presented already in 
the literature. These include single-merger models, homogenous-good models, and models including 
pair-wise mergers.22 
While the second stage of this game is a standard industry-oligopoly game, the first stage is a bit 
more subtle. In that first stage, any of the n firms non-cooperatively chooses an optimal desired 
                                                                 
21 Quasi-linear generalized quadratic utility function of a single consumer is given by U = aSci  – 0.5gSciScj – 
0.5(b-g)Sci
2. For large n, we can approximate this relation by using integrals rather than sums: U = a￿ci  – 0.5g￿ci￿cj – 
0.5(b-g)￿ci
2. Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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merger size and then will form a merger, i.e. a coalition, with the appropriate number of like-minded 
other firms. Since in equilibrium, this will result in all firms being part of some merger, these mergers 
form a partition of the original space of n firms.23 In addition, due to the nature of coalition formation, 
merger choices of any firms actually change available strategy spaces of all other firms.  
Nevertheless, since the individual decision to join a coalition is non-cooperative, we still can obtain 
Nash-equilibria in mergers under certain conditions. In particular, we can formulate conditions for the 
existence of a symmetric equilibrium and then describe its properties. The game is solved, as usual, 
by backwards induction, so we present the Cournot stage next. 
 
3.2. Cournot Competition 
Given that firms are identical, we can invoke symmetry within a particular merger m. The profit 
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where Q
-m = ￿qh = Q – m qim.24 Replacing Q















  (3.5) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
22 Compare Perry/Porter (1985), Salant/Switzer/Reynolds (1983), Böckem (2002), and others. 
23 On coalition formation, see Ray/Vohra (1999) and, e.g. the literature discussion in Levy (2004). 
24 The Cournot stage of this game is an aggregative game since the underlying utility is completely symmetric. On 
aggregative games and their properties, see e.g. Cornes/Hartley (2005). Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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Since the reaction function (3.4) is continuously differentiable and monotonously decreasing with a 
slope between zero and minus one half for all parameter constellations, a Cournot equilibrium exists 
for any possible merger partition among the n firms in the market.  
Let a merger partition M be given by: 
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3.3. Cournot Competition with Symmetric Mergers 
Since the demand structure is completely symmetric and firms are a-priori identical, individual firms 
will only care about the number of firms in the merger they prefer to join as well as about all other 
mergers’ sizes, but not about individual identities. As we will show further below, this implies the 
existence of equilibria that are symmetric in merger sizes under certain conditions. While symmetric 
merger equilibria are not possible for any n > 4 in the standard Cournot case without cost effects of 
mergers25, they will result if mergers reduce variable costs of merger-insiders sufficiently.  
Therefore, it is useful to characterize Cournot equilibria for the case of n/m symmetric mergers of size 
m each. Such a Cournot equilibrium implies that Q = n qim
Q; using this relationship to solve equation 
(3.5) yields then the following symmetric equilibrium solution: Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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  (3.11) 
Note that qi
m is the quantity produced and ￿i
m is the profit gained by a single firm (within each 
merger m).  
 
3.4. Individual Merger Choice and Merger Partitions 
Define a residual partition to the (potential) merger j as: 
















￿￿ ￿   (3.12) 
For any merger partition M = {M
-j, mj} involving k mergers, we can write k representative single-




iimjmj MqMpqMQMmmjk nf P=--=   (3.13) 
The type of equilibria we will receive will also depend on the equilibrium concept applied and the 
behavioral assumptions used. In the simplest case, we can assume that all firms act non-
cooperatively, even within potential mergers, and that they chose mergers to join simultaneously such 
that a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium results. A sufficient condition for any such Nash equilibrium 
between non-cooperative firms, where size of the merger to be joined is the individual strategic 












  (3.14) 
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Proposition 1 
If (3.14) holds for all mj
* ˛ M
*, then M
* is a Nash-equilibrium merger partition.  
Proof:  Due to the definition of Nash-equilibrium, M
-j* will be unchanged regardless of the action of 
any firm within the merger mj*. If one firm leaves merger mj*, then that firm becomes a singleton and 
merger mj* loses one member. As a singleton, the leaving firm will make less profit than if it remained 
in the merger. QED 
 
Note that Proposition 1 holds f or symmetric and asymmetric merger partitions alike. Since any 
(candidate) equilibrium is a partition, the strategy space of each firm is bounded upwards at the 
equilibrium. However, this implies that firms do not coordinate even within an existing merger 
coalition if breaking up that coalition would benefit all of them. This assumption is arguably too 
strong. Allowing for coordination to dissolve or reconfigure within existing mergers then requires in 
addition to (3.14) that each merger within an equilibrium merger partition M
* is coalition-proof. A 


























  (3.15) 
 
Proposition 2 
If (3.15) holds for all mj
* ˛ M
*, then M
* is a Nash-equilibrium merger partition with individually 
coalition-proof mergers. 
Proof:  The equilibrium property follows from Proposition 1, since condition (3.15) fully contains 
condition (3.14). Coalition-proofness follows since the right-hand side of (3.15) covers all possible 
sub-coalitions of any merger mj*. ˛ M
*. QED 
 
Condition (3.15) does not guarantee that any individually coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in mergers 
is also a stable coalition structure if renegotiation between equilibrium mergers were allowed. It is not 
ruled out that any such equilibrium may be Pareto-dominated by other existing Nash-equilibria. Still Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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condition (3.15) is too general for our purposes, since the number of sub-coalitions to be checked 
becomes large very quickly with increasing merger size. 




































  (3.16) 
In (3.16), condition (a) requires that profits are strictly increasing in merger size, while condition (b) 
requires that the profit change resulting from a change of own-merger size is always larger than the 
effect resulting from compensating changes in any other merger. 
 
Proposition 3 
Assume that (3.14) and (3.16) hold for all mj
* ˛ M
* and M
* is a symmetric merger partition with k 
mergers. Then there exists no other merger partition with k’ ‡ k mergers that Pareto-dominates M
*. 
Proof:  Any alternative merger partition M’ with k’ ‡ k mergers would need to include at least one 
merger with mj’ < mj
*, resulting in lower profits for the firms in this merger. QED 
 
Any merger coalition satisfying (3.14) and (3.16) cannot be Pareto-dominated by some other 
coalition involving one or more smaller mergers. It follows, that symmetric merger coalitions, if at all, 
can only be dominated by coalitions that weakly increase merger sizes for all firms involved.  
 
Corollary 1 
(a) Assume that (3.14) and (3.16) holds for full cartelization, i.e. all M
* contains one merger only with 
mj
* = n. Then M
* is Pareto-efficient, i.e. M
* is a stable coalition structure. Furthermore, any other 
symmetric merger partition, is Pareto-dominated, i.e. it is not a stable coalition structure. 26 
                                                                 
26 See also Ray/Vohra (1999), section 3. Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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Proof:  Result (a) follows directly from Proposition 3. For result (b), Any alternative symmetric 
merger partition M’ with k’ > 1 would involve strictly smaller mergers. Moving to full cartelization 
therefore strictly increases profits of all firms. QED 
 
However, asymmetric merger coalitions are still possible, even with identical firms. If firms are 
identical, asymmetric equilibria require that mergers are “corner solutions” for at least (k-1) of the k 
mergers in equilibrium. Corner solutions here mean that condition (a) in (3.16) potentially continues 
to be satisfied for merger sizes larger than the equilibrium merger size. This is true, in particular, when 
condition (a) in (3.16) is satisfied for all merger sizes less than or equal to market size n (the total 
































  (3.17) 
On the other hand, we can have “internal merger equilibria” if the payoff functions of individual firms 
are globally maximized at the equilibrium merger size. In that case, larger mergers attainable through 
fusions with additional firms from other mergers can only lead to less profits per firm. Hence, 
reducing the number of mergers does not lead to an increase in merger size, since members of former 
















































  (3.18) 
 
Proposition 4 
Assume that (3.14) and (3.18) hold for all  mj
* ˛ M
* with  k symmetric mergers. Then M
* is a 
(symmetric) Nash equilibrium merger partition. It is also Pareto-optimal, hence a stable coalition 
structure. Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
  14 
Proof:  From (3.14) and (3.18) (a) and (b), profit is globally concave in own merger size for the 
whole range of possible merger sizes in an n-firm market. Given that, it follows from (3.18) (c) that 
profit is also single-peaked across all possible residual merger configurations. QED 
 
Below in Section 5, we present a simplified model with independent demands, i.e. without cross-
price effects, satisfying conditions (3.14) and (3.18) and leading to a Pareto-optimal, internal 
symmetric Nash equilibrium merger partition, i.e. a symmetric stable coalition structure. 
 
4. Mergers or Divestitures in a Heterogeneous-Goods Demand System without Cost 
Effects of Mergers 
Before further analyzing merger equilibria, it is instructive to investigate what incentives firms within an 
n-firm oligopoly have with respect to a possible divestiture rather than joining a merger. Below we 
present this analysis for our demand system, i.e. for heterogeneous goods and linear demand. Note 
that for a Cournot oligopoly in homogeneous goods, this problem has already been addressed by 
Baye/Crocker/Ju (1996); they also present a generalization for demand functions satisfying 
Novshek’s (1985) conditions for the existence of a Cournot equilibrium. 
 
4.1. Incentive for a Single Firm to Join a Merger or to Divest 
In the simplest possible setup with constant unit cost (i.e. constant marginal costs and no fixed costs), 
“divesting” for a single firm could be the decision to split up into a number j of additional independent 
firms rather than staying single or joining a merger. When this is done, the new divested entity owns 
(j+1) independent firms and their profits and the market has increased to size (n+j). If the firm 
hypothetically  joined a merger of all n firms, then it would receive an n
th share of that markets 
monopoly profits. 
As we know already, joining a monopoly merger always increases profits in comparison to the initial 
n-firm oligopoly. However, for a single firm, marginal profits from merging are negative since the 
(negative) market-share effect dominates the (positive) market-concentration effect. Since divesting 
into additional firms reverses direction, the signs of these effects are reversed and establishing 
additional f irms marginally increases profits. Eventually, the (now negative) market concentration Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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effect will dominate again, so that there is another local maximizer at some number j* of divested 
additional firms. Below, we compare profits at these two local maximizers after calculating the 
optimizing number of divested firms. 
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For f = 0, the ratio of divestiture profits to merger participation profits is then: 
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Note that for all 0 < ? = b, this ratio will be greater than or equal to 1; it will be exactly equal to one 
for ? = b. Consequently, for any heterogeneous-goods demand system with constant unit costs, the 
following will hold: 
1.) A single firm will always be better off divesting than staying single, ceteris paribus. 
2.) The optimal number of divested firms is (n-3) +2 ß/?. Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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3.) When choosing to divest into the optimal number of new firms, the owner of these new firms is 
(collectively) at least as well off as if he/she had participated in an n-firm (monopoly) merger! 
 4.) Given that firms always prefer divesting to a single monopoly-merger, they also always prefer 
divestiture to any (local) symmetric merger equilibrium with (n/m1) mergers merging m1 firms each.  
 
4.2. Joint Decisions of all Firms: A Nash-Equilibrium in Divestitures 
Since ¶j*/¶n = 1 and ¶n/¶j* = 1, there can be no finite Nash equilibrium in divestitures without cost 
increasing in j*.27  
However, with a fixed cost of f per new single-product firm, an internal divestiture equilibrium exists. 
Let nj be the total number of resulting firms in the divestiture equilibrium, while n is the number of 
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Setting the operating profits equal to the fixed setup cost of the marginal firm and solving for nj will 
yield the Nash-equilibrium number of firms to divest as (nj
*/n)-1) where nj










=   (4.8) 
Constant f requires zero-profits in equilibrium, since equilibrium is reached when each owner sets 
market operating profits of the marginal new firm equal to marginal f. With f increasing in n, positive 
overall profits of the multi-firm owners are possible! However, any divestiture equilibrium of this kind 
will now be Pareto-dominated by a single monopoly merger. Proposition 1 in Baye/Crocker/Ju 
(1996) already established existence of the equilibrium result in equation (4.8) above for the 
homogeneous-goods case, where the solution of equation (7), d
*, corresponds to nj
* in our equation 
(4.8). 
 
                                                                 
27 This result corresponds to Baye/Crocker/Ju (1996), Proposition 2, for homogeneous goods. Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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5. Mergers and Divestitures under Monopolistic Competition 
This section presents internal solutions with  several symmetric mergers in a monopolistic market, 
where variable costs fall with merger size while fixed costs per single-product unit rise with merger 
size. Explicit analytical solutions for this model are available, because we set ? = 0 and therefore 
individual single-product inverse demand collapses to pi = a – b qi. Therefore, this model can serve 
as a benchmark. 
Mergers are always profitable in comparison to staying an outsider because of the resulting reduction 
of variable costs. Since the products exhibit zero-substitutability, individual merger choices are 
independent of the size of other mergers in the market, since own market demands are not 
affected. Likewise, outsiders’ market shares are not affected so they cannot gain from any mergers 
among other firms. 
 Cournot quantity reaction functions and equilibrium quantities are identical since they do not depend 
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Assuming  L=1 and setting cost functions equal to nm = n/m and fm.  = (f m), the Cournot 
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In order to find the optimal merger choice, we solve for the first-order condition and check the 
second-order condition: Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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The second-order condition is satisfied, given that market size is large relative to marginal costs. Then 
optimal merger size chosen by any merger will be given by the solution to the first-order condition in 
m: 
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  (5.9) 
 In the model presented in this chapter, endogenous merger size: 1.) increases with market size (a); 
2.) increases with variable costs (n), since that also increases economies of scope; 3.) decreases 
with fixed costs (F), since that also increases diseconomies of scope. 
Hence, a merger wave followed by a divestiture wave can happen in each of the following three 
ways: 
A.) An increase in market size (a) where the ex-post realization is smaller than the ex-ante expected 
increase. 
B.) An increase in variable cost (n) where the ex-post realization is smaller than the ex-ante expected 
increase. 
C.) A decrease in fixed cost (F) where the ex-post reduction is smaller than the ex-ante expected 
decrease. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this section, we recapitulate our findings obtained so far; these results can be summarized as 
follows. 
If decisions to join a merger are Nash, i.e. non-cooperative decisions to cooperate are made by 
individual firms, then there may exist an internal Pareto-optimal multi-merger equilibrium under certain 
conditions. This solution requires both strong economies of scope for small merger sizes (mergers 
reduce cost per single-product firm) and increasing diseconomies of scope for large merger sizes 
(then cost per firm must eventually increase). These conditions are sufficient to have mergers being 
more profitable than staying outside a merger as a single-product firm. However, in order to have a 
result where mergers reduce profits of outsiders, cost economies of scope must decrease variable 
costs sufficiently. Hence some cost synergies are necessary to obtain stability of equilibria in the 
sense that no firm has an incentive to wait for others to form mergers rather than joining. 
In the resulting equilibrium, endogenous merger size is a function of market parameters as well as 
cost synergy parameters. Hence anticipated changes in market size and/or cost synergies attainable 
through mergers will lead to reconfigurations of merger sizes.  If ex-ante expectations about merger-
promoting changes are not fully realized ex-post, merger waves will be followed by divestiture waves 
in our model. In addition, firm valuation - based on ex-ante expectation - may increase while actual 
profits and efficiency of the merged entity - according to the ex-post realization - may fall. 
As future research will show, these results hold in principle no matter what the degree of 
substitutability between products: from monopolistic to homogenous products. However, the higher 
the substitutability, the higher need to be both the scope economies (to make a merger profitable at 
all) and the scope diseconomies (to yield an internal solution) – internal here means more than just 
one merger in equilibrium! With zero-substitutability monopolistic competition, results will be totally 
driven by cost effects of mergers.  
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Appendix A: A Continuous Interval of Firms 
Our analysis remains virtually unchanged, if we assume the range of single-product firms to be an 
interval [1, n] rather than a series of countable products. To see this, we introduce integrals into the 
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Note that qi
c is the quantity produced and ￿i
c is the profit gained by a single firm (within each merger 
m). 
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Appendix B: Demands in the Presence of Other Mergers and a Single-Firm Fringe 
















































































































1 ) ( ) ( g g g b a , k = 1, 2, j  (B.4) 
where subscript 1 denotes merger 1, subscript 2 denotes each of the n2 other mergers, and subscript 
h denotes each of the remaining single-product firms. 
 
Appendix C: Merger Partial Derivatives of the Profit Function 
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Appendix D: No Cost Synergies – No Complete Merger Partition: Example 1 
In a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand, homogeneous goods and constant cost, let {L = 1, (a-n) 








  (D.1) 
Let Pn
m be profits of a single firm in a merger with m firms that competes in a market with a total of n 









































  (D.2) 
According to Ray/Vohra (1999), p. 302, Theorem 3.6., the unique stable coalition structure involves 
a single merger with nine firms and one singleton firm remaining. Any smaller coalition will collapse 
leaving everybody with the smaller profits P10
1. Full cartelization is not sustainable, since one firm 
could leave without having to fear that the remaining coalition P2
9 collapses, since P2
9 > P10
1. Note 
that this coalition structure is not a Nash equilibrium since P3
1 > P2
9! Similarly, any combination of 
several smaller mergers will also collapse. Gaisford & Lutz: Mergers & Heterogeneous Products     
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Appendix E: A Complete Merger Partition with Variable Cost Synergies: Example 2 
In a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand, homogeneous goods and constant cost, let {L = 1, a= 
1, b = 1, f = 0, nm =0.5 (z-m+1)/z, z = 10}.  
In Figure E.1. below, m1 is on the horizontal axis, profits are on the vertical axis, and the left panel 
shows the case of two mergers with possible outsiders, while the right panel shows the case with only 
a single merger with possible outsiders. In each panel, the lowest profit curve is that of the outsider 
singleton.  
Panel (a) shows 10 firms and two (potential) mergers. For merger m2 = 5, profits of merger m1 are 
strictly increasing in m1, profits of merger m2 are strictly decreasing in m1 and profit of any firm 
staying outsider is strictly decreasing in m1 for all m1 £  6. 
Note that for M
* = {5, 5}, Propositions 1, 2 and 3 hold! M
* = {5, 5} is a Nash-equilibrium merger 
partition with individually coalition-proof mergers. However, it is Pareto-dominated by full 
cartelization, i.e. by M
** = {10}! Panel (b) shows 10 firms and one (potential) merger. Profits of 
merger m1 are strictly increasing in m1 while profit of any firm staying outsider is strictly decreasing in 
m1 for all m1 £ 10. M
** = {10} is a stable coalition structure! 
 
Figure E.1: Profits with Variable Cost Synergies: Example 2 
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